HOBBES, LOCKE AND THE STATE OF NATURE THEORIES:
A REASSESSMENT

Michael P. Greeson
University of Central Oklahoma
Both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke utilize a "state of nature"
construct to elucidate their more general views onhuman nature and
politics. Yet their conceptions of man's original condition in the state
of nature are usually contrasted: the political philosophy of Locke's
Second Treatise paints man as a "pretty decent fellow," far removed
from the quarrelsome, competitive, selfish creatures said to be found
in Hobbes's Leviathan. 1 Lockean man seems to be more naturally
inclined to civil society, supposedly more governed by reason. From
this interpretation of human nature, Locke concluded that the state
of nature was no condition of war, placing himself in opposition to
the traditional interpretation of Hobbes.
Itismy contention that although Locke painstakingly attempts to
disassociate himself with the Hobbesian notion of the "se1f-inter
ested man" in a perpertual "state of war," the execution of this
attempt falls short, and can even be recognized to implicitly (if not
explicitly) contain the very reasoning that Hobbes ulilizes to advo
cate the movement ofman from the state of nature to civil society. In
order to demonstrate the truth ofthis contention, I will briefly ou tline
the development of their philosophies and offer both a reinterpreta
tion ofthe Hobb esian sta te of nature, and a cri tical anal ysis 0 fLoc ke' 5
view of the state of nature in the Second Treatise.
I. Hobbes: Method and Problem

Hobbes offered a materialistic metaphysics that utilized a simpli
fied version of Galileo's resolutio-compositive method. According
to this method, complex phenomena are broken down into their
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simplest natural motions and components. Once these elements are
understood, the workings of complex wholes are easily derived.
Hobbes' intent was to develop a systematic study in three parts,
starting with simple motions in matter (De Corpore), moving to the
study of human nature (De Homine) , and finally to politics (De Cive),
each based, respectively, on a lower level of analysis (Lasco and
Williams, p. 230). Hence, reality for Hobbes is reducible to mechanis
tic and material principles, or, simply stated, bodies m motion. If we
are to understand politics. Hobbes suggests that we should look at
such phenomena in tenus of the relationships between "men in.
motion."
Furthermore, Hobbes adopted the Galilean proposition that that
which is in motion continues in motion until altered by some other
force. (Of course, this is a theoretical assumption which, indepen
dently, cannot be proven true or false, since all we do observe are
bodies that are acted upon by such forces). Likewise, Hobbes as
sumed that human beings act voluntarily based upon their "pas
sions," until they are resisted by another force or forces. This outward
motion of the individual is the beginning of voluntary motion, which
Hobbes calls "endeavor." Endeavor directed towards an object is
called "appetite" or" desire." Endeavor dlrected away from an object
is called "aversion" (Gauthier, p. 6).
The several passions of man are "species" of desires and aversion,
which are directed toward those objects whose effects produce
pleasure and away from those objects which produce pain. Thus,
Hobbes conceives men to be self-maintaining engines whose "mo
tion is such that it enables them to continue to 'move' as long as
continued motion IS possible" (Gauthier, p. 7).
From this account of utili tous motion, itlogically follows, accord
ing to Hobbes, that each man in the state of nature seeks only to
preserve and strengthen himself. "A concern for continued well
being is both the necessary and sufficient ground of human action;
hence, man.is necessarily selfish" (Gauthier, p. 7).
!tis this perpetual endeavor for self-preservation within the state
of nature which gives rise to a condition of "war." Hobbes believes
that men, being originally all equal in the "faculties of the body and
mind," equally hope to fulfill their ends of vital motion (Leviathan, p.
100). Hence, if "two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless
they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies," for both, knowing
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naturalmorallaw would b e privy to the unconditional, absolute and
categorical right to preserve oneself at all cost (Leviathan, p. 98). This
state of war encompasses all, "everyman, against everyman" (Levia
than, p. 100). Without a common power to police and settle disputes,
man is in a perpetual condition of war; "war consisting not only in
battle, orin the act of fighting, but in a willingness to contend by battle
being sufficiently recognized" (Leviathan, p. 100). The state of nature
is seen as a condition in which the will to fight others is known,
fighting is not infrequent and each individual perceives that his life
and well-being are in constant danger (Leviathan, p. 100). Accord
ingly, menin the state of nature live without security other than their
own strength; this is argued to be the natural condition of mankind,
and leads Hobbes to the conclusion that such existence is "natural"
to man, but not rational (whereas society is seen as rational, but not
natural, contra Aristotle) (Kavka, p. 292).
It is within this irrational condition of "war," or Hobbesian"fear"
or "despair," in which humanbeings find little hope of attaining their
ends without conflict, that mortal men are compelled to elect a
sovereign and move out of the state of nature; only then can the
imperative of self-preservation be truly fulfilled through peace
(Lemos, p. 24). It is important to note that the state of nature, for
Hobbes, is a philosophic device employed as a means ofhypothesiz
ing about human behavior in a pre-political and pre-socia] state, Le.,
a state without any extemal constraint on behavior. As Hobbes
indicates, His not necessary to presume such a state actually existed,
only that it captures essential features human beings would exhibit
in such a condition.
Hobbes' political philosophy was received in his own time with
nearly universal rejection, being more often renounced than actually
read. Hobbes was labelled an atheist, the "monster of Malmesbury,"
a schemer, a heretic and a blasphemer (De Cive, p. xx). His advocacy
of an absolute monarch as the solution to man's inherent condition
further distanced him from the "enlightened" mainstream of 17th
century political thought, including Locke's philosophy. It is a
commonly held view that although Locke makes no specific mention
of Hobbes in the Second Treatise, it may nonetheless be interpreted as
an attempt to systematically refute both the notion of absolute mon
archy and Hobbes's description of the state of nature (Lemos, p. 74).
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II. John Locke: Method and Problem
Philosophy, Locke tells the reader in the introduction ofhis Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, is "nothing but true knowledge of
things." Properly, philosophy contains the whole of knowledge,
which Locke himself divides into three parts: a physica or natural
philosophy, practica or moral philosophy, and logic, the" doctrine of
signs." The goal of the philosopher is to build as complete a system
as he possibly can within these three categories (Aaron, p. 74).
Yet Locke persuasively argues in the Essay that mankind's ability
to gain true knowledge is significantly limited, and sets himself the
task of determining the demarcations of human knowledge. To help
mankind rid itself of this "unfortunate" failing, he argues that man
has been endowed with talents capable of allowing him to live a
useful and profitable life. The Essay is extremely pradical: we should
concentrate on what we can know, and not waste our energy or e Hort
searching for knowltdge of things which lie beyond us (Aaron, p. 77).
It is exactly these practical and utilitarian ends that moti va ted the
construction of his nloral and political philosophy. Although politi
cal and moral philosophy are not reducible to metaphysical plin
dples thot app.ly outside of their respective fields of inquiry (thus
explnining the difficulties between advocating, on one hand, the
strict empiricism of the Essay, and, on the other hand, the rationalist
naturalluw theory of the Two Treatises), in all of his writings Locke
assumes, fu ndamentally, that man knows enough to live a good and
righteous hfe if he so chooses.
Locke argued that the state of nature is not identical to the state
of war, and, although it is "inconvenient," nature is governed by a
nuturullnw known by reason, the "coounon rule and measure God
hus given mankind." The nalurallaw "teaches all mankind who will
but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no on€: ought to
harm anothel: in his Hfe, health, liberty or property" (Locke, p. 4). If
the law of nature is observed, the state of nature remains peaceful;
conv(mtional wisdom defines this condition as one of mutual love
(via the "judicious" Richard Hooker), from whence are "derived the
great maxims of justice and charity" (Locke, p. 4).
Yet, according to Locke, God has instilled in natural man a
"strong obligation of necessity, convenience and inclination to drive
him into society"; hence, men quit their "natural power, resigned it
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up into the hands of the community" for the assurance that their
property will be preserved (Locke, pp. 44, 48, 53).
Men being, as has been said, by nature free, equal and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate and
subjected to the political power of another without
his own consent. The only way whereby anyone
divests himself of his natural liberty and put on the
bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to
join and unite into a community for their comfortable,
safe and peaceable living one amongst another, in a
secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater
securitr against any that are not of it. (Locke, p. 53).2

An equally important factor motivating men to forfeit the perfect
freedom of the state of nature is that within this environment, each
man has a right to interpret natural law and to punish what he judges
to be violations of it (Lemos, p. 85). Anyone who violates another's
right to life, liberty or property has placed himself in a state of war,
and the innocent party has the right to destroy those who act against
him because those that are waging war do not live under the rule of
reason, and, as a result, have no other rule but that of force and
violence. Furthermore, this state of war would be perpetual if justice
could not be fairly administered (Locke, pp. 11,13).
Therefore, in order to avoid a state of war, Locke suggests that
one must forfeit the state of nature, creating an environment where
disputes can be decided upon by an impartial authority (Locke, p.
14).
It would seem, at least upon prima facia analysis, that although

both thinkers utilize a state of nature device to demonstrate political
necessity, their similarities would end there. Hobbes' slate of nature
would seem to be populated by self-interested egoists whose per
sonal gain is ultimately important. Locke ,on the other hand, appears
to suggest that a "civil" nature permeates pre-ci viI society to such an
extent that man is voluntarily obliged to respect his fellow human
beings. and the formation of civil society soon follows.
The common conception regarding the state of nature theories of
Hobbes and Locke is thus presented. I shall now turn to the argu
2
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ments as to why this conception is invalid, beginning wi th a reassess
ment of Hobbes' position, followed by specific argtunents regarding
Locke 'snotion of pre-political man' smoti vation to pursue civil ends.
III. Reassessing Hobbes
To understand morality and politics, Hobbes argues that one
must understand man qua man; hence, psychology becomes the
necessary foundation of moral and political science. And the only
way to view mankind in its most natural condition is to assume a
hypothetical state of nature in which men act purely out of passion,
void of reason at Ieast initially. Hobbes' account ofthe state of nature,
as shown in Chapter 17 of Leviathan, was expressly "designed to
provide a glimpse of man without the garb of convention, h'adition
orsociety, so asto uncover the underlying principles ofthemundane
equity of natural man, without assuming an transcendent purpose or
will" (Lasco and Williams, p. 252). Therefore, Hobbes' prescription
for stability was a deduction from the necessary behavior of man in
a theoretical society, nnt emphasizing how men ought to act, but
rather how they would act void of any relationships, whatsoever. It
is in this condition that our endeavors dispose us towards plensllre
or pain; man, being concerned with only those endeavors which
serve to preserve himself, chooses those objects which meet this
condition. Hence, man wOl1Jd find himself often in competition with
others for the same objects, and a state of war would ensue, with each
having the "right to everything" he wishes. 3
Historically, the negative interpretation of this condition of
nature, being a "war of all against all," has been dominant in political
and philosophical circles. Sterling Lamprecht defines the common
conception of Hobbes' psychology as follows:
God made man such a beast and a rascal that he
3Keep in mind that the aim of Hobbes is not to suggest thnt we can actually
observe such a condition, or that it is even remotely possible; this is m0rdy a
fundqmental axiom in Hobbes' thought experiment. In fact, R.E. Ewin hilS nrgued
that this more radical form of the natural condition is lIsed by Hobbes as part of a
reductio, as to pointou t the logical inconsistencies between simultaneously ilssuming
the existence of both such a natur<ll condition and the pursuit of self-preservation:
they ultimately prove contradictory (Ewin, p. 108).
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inclines universally to malice and fraud. Man's typi
cal acts. UJ1Jess he is restrained by force, are violent
and ruthless, savagely disregarding the persons and
property of his fellows. His greatest longing is to
preserve himself by gaining power over others and
exploiting others for his own egoistic ends (De Cive, p.
xx).

Lamprecht labels this view "Hobbism," and argues that in this
view of human nature, Hobbes is far from being a Hobbist. Hobbes
gives, to be sure, a picture of man in the state of nature which is far
from becoming. But, Lamprecht argues, Hobbes did not intend to say
that his picture of man in the state of nature is an exhaustive account
of human nature. Rather, the concept of man in the state of nature
enables us to measure the extent to which reason and social pressures
Le., other "forces" determine and direct the expression of human
passions.
The idea of man in the state of nature is for social
science like that of a natural body in physical science.
Physical science holds that a body continues in a state
of rest or uniform motion in a straight line unless
influenced by outside forces. Actually, there is no
body which is not influenced by outside bodies; but
the idea of such a body enables us to measure the
outside forces (De Cive, p. xxi).
Such a natural man in "full motion" would be observable when
ever one operates wholly under the dominion of passion, without the
restraint, or to use Hobbes' language, "the opposing force," o.f
reason. Man, acting on his own, with no concern for others' sel£
preservation, guided by short-term considerations only, is doomed
to failure in a state of nature. But if long-term moral and political
arrangements (i.e., a voluntary social contract) enable them to main
tain themselves without facing a war of all against all, then the basic
cause for hostility is removed (Gauthier, pp. 18-19). In fact, many
scholars suggest that the whole concern of Hobbes' moral and
political philosophy is to show men the way out of this short-term
condition of war and into a long-term condition of peace, for human
life can continue only if mankind can remove itself from such a
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condition. David Gauthier, in his treatise titled The Logic OfLeviathan,
states this argument most eloquently:
In the beginning, everyman has an unlimited right to
do what he will, conceiving it to be for his preserva

tion. But the exercise of this unlimited right is one of
the causes of the war of all against all, which is
inimical to preservation. Thus the unlimited right of
nature proves contradictory in its use; the man who
exercises his right in order to preserve himself con
tributes thereby to the war of all against all, which
tends to his own destruction. And so it is necessary to
give up some part of the unlimited natural right. ...
The fundamental law of nature is "that every man
ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of
obtaining it." The law is the most general conclusion
man derives from his experience of the war of all
against all. Clearly it depends on that experience,
whether real or imagined. Although hypothetically a
man might conclude that it was necessarily inimical
to human life, only an analysis of the human condi
tion with all social bonds removed shows that peace
is the primary requisite for preservation (Gauthier,
pp.51-53),
The salvation of mankind, for Hobbes, depends on the fact that
although nature has placed him in an unpleasant condition, it has
also endowed him with the possibility of removing himself from it,
as revealed through the use of reason i.e., the rational desire to pursue
those avenues in which the hope of attaining peaceful existence is
real! To argue that the state of nature, for Hobbes, is purely brutish
and warlike, devoid of rationality or reason, is to miss the point: it is
a necessary ingredient to lead man out of the state of nature and into
a civil society. Hobbes' visionofnaturernightbe but a limited guide;
yet, to borrow the words of Gauthier, "it is a truth which we must
endeavor to overcome-but we shall not overcome it if we misunder
stand it, deny it, or ignore it (Gauthier, p. 180).
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IV. Locke and Political Motivation
What follows are several arguments which independently sug
gest that the Lockean state of nature implicitly admits of a Hobbesian
condition of war, for Locke himself views conflict as the primary
motivating factor that necessarily compels man to leave the state of
nature and enter civil society.
Initially, it is important to establish a fundamental point of
difference between these two theories: Locke's state of nature is pre
political (Le., prior to common authority). whereas, for Hobbes, it is
pre-social. Locke refers to a situation in which a collection of human
beings are not subject to political authority, not a situation in which
there exists no form of rudimentary organization, much less an
organized society (Lemos, p. 89). Hobbes uses the expression "state
of nature" to denote a situation in which men do not live in any form
of society at all, regardless of how fundamental. Furthermore, his
definition tells us w hat people would be like if they could be divested
of "all their learned responses or culturally induced behavior pat
terns, especially those such as loyalty patriotism, religious fervor or
class honor" that frequently could override the "fear" that Hobbes
speaks of so dramatically in pre;-civil society (Hinchman, p. 10).
If we were to assume man as existing pre-socially as Hobbes does
(a condition without, trade, without the arts, without knowledge,
without any account of time, without society itself), it seems a rather
intuitive implication that he might be motivated by only self-cen
tered drives, for that would be the extent of his learned behavior
within this condition. Locke, on the other hand, takes social and
cultural bonds for granted and argues purely from a pre-political
position. Even a hypothetical Lockean might act a bit more selfishly
in a Hobbesian state of nature; once semantic discrepancies are taken
into account, these definitions already begin to appear closer to
agreement.
Secondly, Locke's position seems tobe a normative prescription,
as opposed to a theoretical description. For example: in chapter II,
section 6 of the Second Treatise, Locke argues that through reason,
those who consult the law of nature will learn that no one "ought" to
harm another's life, liberty or possessions. This phrasing seems to
suggest a normative position, prescribing how man should live in a
state of nature, versus the account that Hobbes constructs upon his
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theoretical premises. These positions are not mutually exclusive: one
can observe pre-civil manin a Hobbesian state of nature and morally
prescribe a Lockean state of nature as a more "civil" alternative.
Thirdly, Locke seems to provide evidence for the Hobbesian
assumption thatman often acts out of selfishness and criminal intent.
Initially Locke seems somewhat ambiguous about precisely what
motivates the man of nature to move to civil society: he states that
God has instilled a "strong obligation of necessity, convenience and
inclination to drive him into society." But why would man leave a
state of nature that, at least according to Locke, provides him the
ultimate liberty and power over his destiny, a condition that he likens
to "a state of peace , good-will, mutual assistance and preservation"?
If the man in the state of nature be so free, as has been
said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and
possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to
nobody, why will he part with his freedom, why will
he give up his empire and subject himself to the
domin.bn and control of any other power? To which
it is obvious to answer that though in the state of
nature he has such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of
others .., This makes him willing to quit a condition
which, however free, is full offeal' and continual dangers
(Locke, p. 71),

He continues:
were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degen
erate men, there would be no need of any other law,
no necessity that men should separate from this great
and natural community" (Locke, p. 72).
If Locke 'sstate of nature is truly as "rational" and "concerned" as
he suggests, why is the only motivating factor powerful enough to
move men out of this condition that which he so vehemently denies
exists: a Hobbesian condition of "war"?
Locke clearly states in the Second Treatise that one of the natural
rights that must be granted to all men in the state of nature, equally,
is that man should interpret natural law for himself and decide upon
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appropriate punishment for offenders since there exists no common
judge to settle controversies between men. It is precisely this intui
tive and pre-political knowledge of the natural law that is said to
enlighten man to the burdens of civil SOciety.
Yet Locke argues persuasively that any knowledge of a natural
law is more often than not hindered due to mankind's inherent
epistemic limitations. Man's own unquenchable and boundless cu
riosi ty itself becomes a hindrance. Richard Aaron uses the words of
Locke's Essay to demonstrate this point:
Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their
capacities and letting their thoughts wander into
these depths where they can find no sure footing, 'tis
no wonder they raise questions and multiply dis
putes, which never coming to any clear resolution,
are proper only to continue and increase their doubts
and to confirm them at last in perfect skepticism
(Aaron, p. 77).
Even if one accepted that a natural law existed, Locke's clear
rejection of man's ability to know this law with any degree of
certainty, combined with his suggestion that foreknowledge of such
a law does not guarantee moral action, would seem to suggest a
condition of skepticism and disagreement. This position is strikingly
similar to Hobbes' argument that although human reason is capable
of discerning the laws of nature, mankind is unable to consistently
follow the dictates of such reason (Lamprecht, De Cive, p. xxix). In
fact, one of the strongest arguments that Locke proposes to reject in
the First Treatise is the divine right theory of Sir Robert Filmer, which
is based upon the notion that even if a right of succession had been
determined by a law of nature, our knowledge of natural law is
limited to such a degree that there remains no compelling reason to
accept one explanation over another.
Furthermore, such subjective interpretations of the natural law
would logically imply an unfairly administered and inconsistent
justice. Locke continues:
for everyone in the state of nature being both judge
and executioner, of the laws of nature, men being
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partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to
carry them too far with too much heat in their own
cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness to
make them remiss in other men's (Locke, p. 71).
This seems contradictory to an environment of peace and fellowship,
and Locke strongly suggests that a state of war would exist if justice
could not be fairly administered.
Consider this: For Locke, in the absence of a neutral judge, no one
can accurately know truthfully whether his cause is right or wrong.
Thus, everyone is at liberty to believe himself right. Patrick Colby
provides case-in-point:
IT one person fears his neighbor, whether with cause
or without (for only an individual can judge), by this
partial and subjective determination the neighbor
becomes a wild beast and is lawfully destroyed. But
when the neighbor, now the target of attack, might
understandably conclude thathis assailant is the wild
beast and so endeavor to execute the law of nature
against him (Colby, p. 3).
But this means that Locke's state of nature will not divide neatly
into groups of "upright law-abiders and selfish malefactors." And if
a distinction cannot be made between such individuals, it would
seem impossible for justice to be administered effectively. Locke
himself deduces suell a conclusion:
The inconveniences that they are therein exposed by
the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power
every man has of punishing the transgressions of
others make them take sanctuary under the law of
government (Locke, p. 71). .
Locke makes it clear from the beginning of his argument and increas
ingly so ashe progresses, that because judgment and punishmen tare
in the hands of everyman, the state of nature works very poorly
(Godwin, pp. 126-127). And in the state of nature, conflict (or a
willingness to contend by conflict), once begun, and once unable to
achieve a satisfactory resolution, would tend to continue to a harsh
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ending, because there exists no authority to subject bothparties to the
fair determination of the law (Godwin, p. 127).
This potential inconsistency in the application of natural law
seems, for Locke, to create significant enough hardships to motivate
man to civil sOciety:
I easily grant that civil government is the proper
remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature,
which must certainly be great where men may be
judges in their own case; since it is easy to be imag
ined that he who was to be unjust as to do his brother
an injury will scarce be so just as to condemn himself
for it (Locke, p. 9).
Clearly, Locke's original state of nature, if not absolutely equiva
lent to Hobbes' state of nature, is at the very least a place of extreme
anxieties, inconveniences, inequality and fear of the potential out
break of war. Locke provides convincing evidence that the state of
nature would be so dangerous and unhappy, and the preservation of
one's right to life so precarious, that the law of nature demands that
the state of nature be abandoned for civil society (Locke, p. 18).
Though Locke suggests that his state of nature is not a Hobbesian
condition of "war," a closer examination of this argument would
tend to suggest that without the failure of the state of nature to
guarantee a secure peace, mankind would never voluntarily choose
to forfeit his absolute freedom. Jean Faurot provides support:
But (Locke's) state of nature also includes a condition
scarcely distinguishable from that which Hobbes
describes as a state of war-all that is needed is for
some man to act contrary to reason, because in the
state of nature every man is obligated to punish
evildoers. In this way, war begins, with the right on
the side of the innocent to destroy the evildoer, or, if
he prefers, to enslave him. Nor is there any end to this
condition in the state of nature, where every man is
both judge and executioner. The slightest disagree
mentis enough to set men fighting, and the victory of
the righteous is never secure. Therefore, menhave the
strongest reasons for leaving the state of nature and
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entering civil society (Faurot, p. 75).
Hence, not only do I argue that Locke's state of nature corre
sponds to Hobbes' notion of a condition of perpetual fear, or the
"state of war," but it actually becomes the identical catalyst by which
Lockean man justifies movement to civil society.
V. Conclusion

The point of this presentation is clear: the common conception of
Locke as the political propounder of the polite school of positive,
optimistic descriptive psychology is an inaccurate characterization.
Furthermore, the also-common contrasting of Locke's view of man
in the state of nature with Hobbes' theoretical consideration of
natural man has been misunderstood. Hobbes did not concern
himself with a "plain, historical method": his concerns were with
devising a system of government (albeit monarchial) that would best
serve mankind's inherent drive for both self-preservation and peace.
Men enter civil society because the state of nature tends to
deteriorate into a condition of unrest and insecurity. If all men were
rational and virtuous, apprehending and obeying a natural law,
th.::.re would be no problem. The presence of a few men acting in
opposition to reason, combined with an environment lacking a
common authority to arbih'ate disputes, creates a condition of insta
bility and provides the necessary impetus for, in Locke's words,
"reasonable part of positive agreement": a social contract (Faurot, p.
75),

Whether one accepts a reinterpretation of Hobbes' state of nature
construct, or a closer examination of Locke's arguments, it is clear
that, although not identical, their analyses offer many striking simi
1arities. And, more importantly. without the instability and fear
within the state of nature, neither philosopher could logically infer
movement from nature to civil society: it becomes the necessary,
perhaps sufficient cause for any social contract.
Therefore, the classical juxtaposition of Hobbes' and Locke's
state of nature theories is at best questionable and far from convinc
ing.
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